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 Abstract
Land and market imperfections shape the organization of agricultural production and lead to different
productionregimeswithinruralfarmhouseholdsinSouthAfrica. Thispaperpresentsatheoreticalmodel
to explain the presence of three main households groups (classes) determined on the basis of the labor
regime adopted: small peasants (working both on and off farm), self cultivators (autarkic in labor) and
hiring in households. Membership in the three categories is determined by the endogenous shadow wage
and the effective market wages. A generalized ordered logit model is used to test the main predictions of
the model. Market imperfections, which prevent household from accessing markets, are expected to have
different impacts on heterogenous households; in this study, a Brant test on coefﬁcient constancy helps
to identify the household speciﬁc factors affecting market participation.
Key words: farm households, market imperfections, liquidity constraint.
1 Introduction
Land and market imperfections shape the organization of agricultural production and lead to different
production regimes within rural farm households. There is a substantial differentiation across households
engaged in agricultural activities which suggests the presence of quite distinct categories of households
in the rural areas. Eswaran and Kotwal (1986)1 use a farm household model in which such categories
emerge as a result of differences in land endowment in a imperfect-markets scenario, where the amount
of credit depends on land ownership and hiring in labor involves supervision costs. Saudolet et al. (1998)
suggest a model which considers transaction costs in the labor market and lead to the identiﬁcation
of three labor regimes (sellers, employers and self-sufﬁcient in labor). Departing from this model we
incorporate an additional constraint showing that the lack of pre-harvesting liquidity also has an inﬂuence
on the labor strategy adopted.
Empirical analysis conducted using data on rural South Africa suggest the presence of quite distinct
household categories. Carter and May (1997) identify 8 classes on the basis of the livelihood strategies
undertaken2 by each group. Such categorization is the result of not only differences in both tangible
(land and labor) and intangible assets (welfare rights, social reciprocity) but also of the constraints on
the ability to effectively exploit such endowments. The usefulness of households categorization emerges
also in Eastwood et al. (2006). The authors deﬁne the household categories on the basis of their special-
ization by income source and identify three groups within rural households in a former homeland area of
the Limpopo Province (South Africa): factor-reliant, migrancy-dependent and pension-dependent house-
holds.
0The author would like to thank Robert Eastwood, Michael Lipton, Jeneesh Manga and Federico Perali for their invaluable
contributions to this work.
1Their model follow the endogenous class formation framework of Roemer (1982) who ﬁrst formalized household labor
regime adoptions.
2These classes are: Marginalized households, Welfare dependent households, Remittance dependent households, Secondary
wage dependent households, Primary wage dependent households, Mixed income households with secondary wages, Mixed
income households with primary wages and entrepreneurial households.
1Using the South Africa Rural Survey (1997) we have identiﬁed three main classes of landed farm
households on the basis of the labor regime adopted: small peasant, self-cultivators and hiring in house-
holds. Transaction costs and the lack of liquidity which largely characterized the rural South Africa
(Fenwick and Lyne, 1999) are expected to inﬂuence household decisions to participate in the labor mar-
ket. A growing literature has focused on the role of transaction costs in the household supply decision
process (Key et al. (2000) and Makhura (2001)) analyzing the relative importance of proportional and
ﬁxed transaction cost in the household market participation.
The aim of this study is to analyze the determinants of the class structure identiﬁed in rural South
Africa; a theoretical framework, built on the classical agricultural household model literature (Singh
et al., 1986), is developed to explain classes emergence and behavior. The model incorporates transac-
tions costs in the labor market which lead to differences in the selling and buying prices of labor (wage
band). A liquidity constraint is also included to represent the liquidity shortage faced by peasants during
the pre-harvesting period which affects household decisions to sell and buy inputs (labor and non labor
inputs) and is reﬂected in their respective shadow prices. The width of the wage bands, therefore, appears
to be inﬂuenced not only by transactions costs but also by the liquidity status of the households.
In a farm household framework the labor strategy adopted depends on the on farm marginal pro-
ductivity of labor and on the market wages, which are affected by transaction costs. Because household
characteristics can have an inﬂuence on both aspects which cannot be distinguished on a theoretical basis,
in the empirical estimation we employ an econometric procedure, called Brant test on coefﬁcient con-
stancy, to identify which household characteristics are determinants of household speciﬁc wage bands
and which others affect on farm labor productivity. In particular, the gender of the household head, ac-
cess to information (newspaper, magazines, radio), the level of development of the local labor market
have been considered as be determinants of transaction costs.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents some descriptive statistics to provide a broad
overview of household categories, in section 3 the theoretical framework is developed and the three
household classes are analyzed separately. Section 4 describes the empirical speciﬁcation adopted and
section 5 reports and discusses the results, ﬁnally section 6 concludes.
2 A theoretical model to explain class structure
This model provides the theoretical explanation for the emergence of different household categories in
a imperfect markets scenario. In particular we consider imperfections in the labor market, allowing for
the presence of transaction costs which are directly translated into the effective cost of labor. The model
departs from the one presented in Saudolet et al. (1998) including the presence of an additional liquidity
constraint. The effective cost of hiring labor (h) is given by the market wage plus search and supervision
costs and is deﬁned as wh. The effective off farm wage includes search and other transaction costs and
is different between unskilled (w1
o) and skilled labor (w2
o). The imperfections in the labor market are
therefore translated into the following relation w1
o < wh < w2
o. Family labor is also allocated to on farm
(skilled and unskilled, f1
q f2
q) and leisure (f1
l f2
l ). The lack of access to inputs such as seeds, fertilizer,
pesticides as well as to technical knowledge is one of the major problems faced by South African farmers.
This is partly due to the lack of liquidity in the pre - harvesting period and the transaction costs in the
input market (the latter are incorporated into the effective price of non-labor production inputs px). As
2reported by several authors3, in rural South Africa, income from non-agricultural sources, such as wage
employment, is important in providing working capital for the purchase of seeds, fertilizers, and other
production inputs; to take this into account we include a liquidity constraint on pre-harvesting period
transactions:





where x represents non-labor production inputs, K are ﬁxed setup costs, and S is the pre-harvesting
amount of exogenous transfers. The household maximizes utility which is a function of leisure and
income, y. Maximization is subjected to the above liquidity constraint together with additional non-
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where  is the marginal value of liquidity, T are exogenous transfers mainly represented by pensions and
remittances and A is the ﬁxed amount of land cultivated by the household4.
The inclusion of a liquidity constraint does not affect farm labor allocation of skilled household
members. As in Saudolet et al. (1998) skilled members do not work on farm. This can be directly derived
from the initial assumption wh < w2
o, which implies that there are no incentives for the household to
employ their skilled members on farm since the foregone wage is higher than the cost of hiring labor.
This is also consistent with the conditions derived above since substituting equations 1a and 5a into 2a
we obtain 1
q = uy(w2
o   wh) + (w2
o   wh) + 2
o + h > 0 which implies zero on farm skilled labor.
3The complete list of study suggesting such conclusions is reported in Van Zyl et al. (1995).
4Since land in South Africa is mainly assigned by local authority which provides only use rights, no market for land is
assumed and agricultural land has no value as collateral (Fenwick and Lyne, 1999) as assumed instead in Eswaran and Kotwal
(1986) model.
3The model cannot explain the presence of households which both hire in and out unskilled labor,
however this category constitutes only a little percentage of our sample and will not be considered in this
study. Given the initial assumption, w1
o < wh, the cost of hiring in labor exceed the forgone wage off
farm of unskilled labor, therefore the household has the incentive to replace hired workers with family
labor. Substituting equations 1a and 2a into 4a and considering households with positive hired labor
(h = 0) we obtain 1
o = uy(wh   w1
o) + 1
q + (wh   w1
o)  0 which implies that no unskilled labor
works off farm5.
Following the same assumptions of Saudolet et al. (1998) we focus on unskilled family labor assum-
ing that once a skilled member is employed off farm little ﬂexibility remains in the choice between time
worked and leisure, therefore f2
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Landed workers. We now specify a lower bound on household assets (including land, human capital
and agricultural capital) such that households below this threshold will consider cultivation unproﬁtable.
This is explain by the presence of ﬁxed set-up costs, K. As reported in Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), a
household will engage in farming activities only if its maximized utility, U
a, obtainable from engaging in
farming activities exceeds the utility of being a pure workers, U




l ;f2(1   k);wo;y
a(f1;f2;A;w;K)) > U
w(f1
l ;f2(1   k);y
w(f1;f2;wo;A))
This conditions determines the emergence of a category of landed workers and should also address the
issue of household preferences on working their own land. For households with Z > Z0 we now analyze
the characteristics of each separate category.
Self-cultivators. This category includes only households self sufﬁcient in labor which do not hire
5On the other side, considering households which members work off farm, no hired labor is admitted.
4labor and which members do not work off farm. The model reduces to the following 4 equations:
1c) pqL = u1=uy = w
2c) pqx = px(1 + =uy) = e px
3c) w2
of2
o + T   pxx   whh   K  0   0
(w2
of2
o + S   pxx   K) = 0
4c) y = pq(A;f1
q;x)   pxx + w2
okf2 + T   K
The marginal productivity of labor in the autarkic case, from now either w or mpla, is a function of
household characteristics and technology and will also be used as a comparison tool in the identiﬁcation
of following categories. The mpla is also inﬂuenced by the presence of a liquidity constraint which
affects the shadow price of purchased inputs e px. When the liquidity constraint is binding, the price
of inputs is given by the effective price, which includes transaction costs, plus an endogenous markup
(=uy) representing the marginal utility of liquidity. Therefore:
w = w(A;f1;f2;T;K;p; e px) = w(A;f1;f2;T;K;p;px;S) (1)
Since wh > wo, self-cultivator shadow wage lays in between the two thresholds, w1
o < w < wh. The
proof of this result will emerge from following subsections.
Small peasant. Households belonging to this category allocate labor both on and off farm while
no hired labor is required. Considering equations 2b and 3b, appropriately adapted to this speciﬁc case
(1
q = 0 and 1














The marginal productivity of family labor, which we deﬁne w
s = w
s(A;f1 fo
q;f2;T;K;p; e px), equals
the shadow price of off farm labor (e w1
o) given by the effective price of labor plus an endogenous markup
caused by the presence of a liquidity constraint. Since the marginal productivity of labor is a decreasing
function of labor it is expected to be higher then the mpla, w
s > w, then:
w < e w1
o
The household will sell labor off farm if the effective wage gained off farm, markup by the presence
of an liquidity constraint is greater than the remuneration they would get if all family members worked
on farm (mpla). The presence of a binding liquidity constraint lower the opportunity cost of being self-
cultivator while increases the shadow off farm wage, therefore shifting the thresholds delimiting this
category (Figure 1).
Hiring in household Households belonging to this category hires in labor in addition to their family
labor. As reported above, there is no off farm labor and considering equations 1b and 2b, with opportune
adjustments (h = 0 and 1











= e wh (3)
5Since the marginal productivity of labor is a decreasing function of labor, w > e wh, that is if the op-
portunity cost of being completely self sufﬁcient in labor is higher than the shadow cost of employing
external workers, the household will hire in labor. The presence of a binding liquidity constraint higher
the shadow price of hiring in labor therefore shifting the thresholds delimiting this category (Figure 1).
The roles played by household characteristics, lack of liquidity and transaction costs in determining
the agrarian class structure are illustrated in Figure 1. To simplify the graphical representation, leisure
has been considered ﬁxed, and the total amount of household unskilled labor is denoted by the vertical
line; changes in household composition are represented by movements in the line. The off farm wage,
wo, lies below the hiring in wage, wh, and the mpla (w) corresponds to the intersection between farm
labor demand and supply: three cases have been considered. In the ﬁrst case, w
A lies between the two
external wages and all family labor is employed on farm at price w
A, the household is autarkic in labor.
In the second case, a lower demand for labor intercepts the supply curve below the off farm wage (w
B),
the household will employ part of its family labor on farm at price wo, selling the rest on the market, f1
o.
The third case is associated to higher labor demands such that the mpla, w
C, exceeds the hiring in wage.
The household will hire in workers (h) at price wh.
Household characteristics inﬂuence the demand and supply of labor as well as the effective external
wages. First, transaction costs (Co;Ch) which depend both on household speciﬁc characteristics and
other factors exogenous to the households, determine the effective market wages, variations in such costs
are depicted by shifts of the horizontal lines. An increase in the transaction costs in the hiring in labor
market, for example, will shift upward the correspondent wage line. At the same time, because both
hired and off farm labor can affect the household liquidity constraint, also this effect is represented by
movements in the wage bands. For a liquidity constrained household, the price of hiring out family
labor has an additional value given by the marginal utility of liquidity and summarized by . Second,
the demand for labor is inﬂuenced by changes in land and skilled labor endowments, non-labor income
and inputs prices which cause shifts of the curve. An increase in farming land, for example, will shift
the demand curve and the interception upward. Depending on the initial conditions, such increase could
cause the switch from small peasants to self-cultivator or from self-cultivators to the hiring in category.
Finally, given the assumption of an inelastic labor supply curve6, only changes in household composition
cause movements in the line. The graph shows how liquidly and household characteristics (indirectly
through their effect on transaction costs) determine the location of the external wage bands. At the same
time, both factors may affect directly and indirectly, through the effect of liquidity on the non-labor input
shadow price, the position of the demand and supply curve. Which characteristics cannot be identiﬁed
from a theoretical point of view and; this issue has to be addressed with the support of econometric
instruments during the empirical estimation.
The same effects, illustrated with the graph, can be depicted through a comparative statics exercise
which, in addition, permits to identify the direction of the effects and offers a set of conditions that can be
empirically tested. Table 1 summarizes the expected signs that have been derived from the comparative
statics reported in Appendix A. Larger endowments of land and higher income transfers are expected to
6This assumption has been introduced only to simplify the graphical representation, it has not been employed in the theo-
retical household model.
6Figure 1: Wage bands and class structure
have a positive impact on the mpla therefore, ceteris paribus, lowering the probability of selling labor
and increasing the probability of hiring in agricultural workers.
Table 1: Results of the comparative statics exercise









In this exercise the shadow price of inputs, e p, which has been ﬁxed to simplify the mathematical
derivation, negatively affects the mpla. It follows that, factors affecting positively the liquidity level of
the households, through their negative effect on the non-labor input shadow price, are expected to affect
positively w. Moreover, larger endowments of unskilled family labor are expected to lower the shadow
price of labor causing the switch from the hiring in labor category to self-cultivators and to small peasants
category (depending on the initial conditions). Finally, the effect of skilled labor is ambiguous. These
predictions will be tested using a generalized ordered logit as described in the following section.
3 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
The membership in one of the three household categories is determined by the endogenous shadow wage,
function of the household characteristics and technology, and the effective wages (for off farm and hired
labor) which are inﬂuenced by household speciﬁc transaction costs. The three household groups can be
ordered in accordance with the underlying latent shadow wage and the probability of belonging to one
7of the three categories can be estimated considering the framework reported below:
P(di = 0) = P(i 2 Small peasant) = P(w
i + " < w1
oi(Coi;i)
P(di = 1) = P(i 2 Self sufﬁcient) = P(w1
oi(Coi;i) < w
i + " < whi(Chj;i)
P(di = 2) = P(i 2 Hiring in households) = P(w
i + " > whi(Chi;i)
Where i indicates the i-th household, Chj and Coj are the determinants of transaction costs associated
with hiring in and out labor and i represents the household speciﬁc liquidity status. The model will be
tested using a generalized ordered logit which allows for household speciﬁc thresholds. This procedure
relaxes the assumption underlying the classical ordered logit model in which the relationship between the
explanatory variables and the response one does not vary across categories (parallel equations assump-
tion). The standard order logit model estimates common thresholds, which in this model correspond to
equal effective external wages across categories. It is widely recognized in the literature (de Janvry et al.,
1991) that households are not affected by market imperfections with the same intensity and many envi-
ronmental, social and cultural factors affect their speciﬁc ability to participate in the markets, therefore
households with different characteristics are expected to face different transaction costs, i.e. different
effective market wages. The used of a generalized ordered logit allows for household speciﬁc thresholds,
however does not completely address the issue. It is not always possible a priori to correctly discrimi-
nate between household characteristics determining the endogenous shadow wage (shifting the demand
and supply curve in Figure 1) and factors affecting, instead, the effective market wages (establishing
the width of wage bands in Figure 1), i.e. the thresholds. The presence of uneducated family labor,
for example, may affect the shadow wage but also the ability of the household to negotiate and avoid
transaction costs. Starting from a classical ordered logit, a coefﬁcient constancy test (Brant test7) is a
useful instrument to determine which variables are determinants of the thresholds, that are those failing
the test. Once the test is performed, the independent variables are allocated either to the thresholds or to
the latent response regression.
The mpla is assumed to be a linear function8 of the shadow price of inputs e pi and of those household
characteristics, Xw
i which the Brant test have identiﬁed as determinants of the latent variable:
w
i = Xw
i w + e pi + "wi (4)
where  is a vector of coefﬁcients and the error "w has a standard logistic distribution. In this spec-
iﬁcation the shadow wage, w, can be also interpreted as an index of the endowment position of the
household. The shadow price of inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers and chemicals can be also linearly
approximated by:
e pi = 
p + X
p
i p + "pi (5)
where the explanatory variables, X
p
i , are representative of both the demand and the supply of inputs.
Given the relationship reported in equation 1, we can substitute 5 into 4 to obtain the reduced form
expression for the shadow wage:
w
i = Xw
i w + (X
p
i p + "pi) + "wi
7An alternative method to test threshold constancy is presented in Pudney and Shield (2000).
8The mpla and the external wages have been expressed as linear functions of observable also in Bedi and Tunali (2005).
8Collecting terms and setting the intercept to zero, the expression reduces to the following:
w = X + v
The two thresholds are assumed to be a linear function of the household speciﬁc determinants of trans-
action costs and liquidity status:
wn = 0 + Zn + 'n
where n = o;h which indicates the off farm and hiring in wage respectively9. First a standard ordered
logit is estimated, meaning that thresholds are considered equal across classes (parallel equation assump-
tion). Then a Brant is performed to assess whether or not the coefﬁcient are the same across categories.
For those variable presenting a signiﬁcant test statistic the constancy assumption has to be rejected. Once
thevariableshavebeenallocatedeithertothethresholdsortotheresponseregression, ageneralizedorder
logit is estimated to characterize the membership to the three household categories. The log likelihood
function is therefore the following:
li(;) = 1[di = 0]log[(wo   X   Z1)] + 1[di = 1]log[(wh   X   Z2)
 (wo   X   Z1)] + 1[di = 2]log[1   (wh   X   Z2)]
where  is the vector of coefﬁcients satisfying the parallel regression assumption and n are the vector
of coefﬁcient which varies across household categories10.
The estimation is based on data collected by the Rural Survey in the 1997. Households engaged
in both hiring in and out of labor have been excluded and constitute the 3% of the entire sample. The
sample has been additionally restricted to those household only involved in maize production (75%).
Three classes have been identiﬁed on the basis of the allocation of unskilled family labor11 and on the
presence of hired labor. Households with members working both on and off farm are deﬁned ”small
peasants” while ”self-cultivators” devote all family labor to the own farming activities and constitute the
largest category in the sample (54 %). Hiring in households, besides family labor, employ additional
hired workers and correspond to the 13% of the sample. Category characteristics are summarized in
Table 2.
Agricultural assets are represented by the hectares of land used for growing ﬁeld crops12, the house-
hold human capital (proxied by the age of the household head13) and by the presence of structures or
buildings on the farm or homestead. An index of land quality is derived from the average productivity of
land (in terms of maize) by district. Exogenous transfers are represented by pensions and remittances and
9For identiﬁcation purpose each variable has to be excluded at least from one of the three equations (the shadow wage and
the two thresholds equations), using the Brant test it is also possible to address this issue.
10The model has been estimated using the stat command gologit2 (Williams, 2006).
11Skilled labor includes those household members with a level of eduction higher than the compulsory general education
and training which runs from grade 0 to grade 9 (Department of Education, Republic of South Africa). In the South Africa
education system there are other two educational bands: further education and training (from grade 10 to 12) and the higher
education and training which includes undergraduate and postgraduate degrees, certiﬁcates and diplomas
12Grazing land is mainly communal and no information is available on the disposal size.
13If the head of the household belongs to the skilled labor forces employed off farm than the oldest member working on farm
is considered.
9Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Small peasants Self-cultivators hiring in hhs
(33.65 %) (53.75 %) (12.6 %)
Land hectares (mean) 1.77 2.14 2.60
Unskilled members (male - mean) 2.76 2.11 2.08
Unskilled members (female - mean) 3.00 2.59 2.47
Skilled members (mean) 1.16 1.21 1.25
Access to pensions (% of hhs) 15.72 29.19 27.11
Migrants 47.11 66.86 68.87
Age of the head (mean) 51.93 55.62 56.14
are measured by the number of retired members14 and employed migrants in the household. Additional
variables are included and concern the access to information (through media and contacts with the agri-
cultural extension ofﬁcers) the length of residency in the area and an index of labor market development
constructed as the average number of employed and unemployed members in the household by district.
4 Results
The results of the coefﬁcient constancy test (Brant test), reported in Table 3, determine the allocation of
each variable either to the thresholds or to the response regressions. Variables presenting a high Chi-
square statistics do not satisfy the parallel regression assumption, their coefﬁcients differ signiﬁcantly
across categories and have been classiﬁed as regressors in the threshold equations. Land, labor (skilled
and unskilled) and human capital endowments are determinants of the marginal productivity of labor
(mpla). The length of residency in the area also does not fail the test and will be included in the response
equation. In contrast with the empirical speciﬁcation of Saudolet et al. (1998), the Brant test suggests
that pensions and remittances have to be included as regressors in the threshold equation. While this
does not alter the overall interpretation of their impact on class structure, which remains in line with
previous ﬁndings, it suggests that the lack of liquidity is affecting the household labor strategy adopted.
In a unconstrained scenario, pensions and remittances would not have any effects on the thresholds (as in
Saudolet et al. (1998)), however, in the South Africa context the inclusion of a liquidity constraint seems
to be more appropriate as it captures the effect of the marginal utility of liquidity on the effective market
wages. The access to information and the level of development of the local labor market also affect the
effective wages.
The results of the generalized ordered logit are reported in Table 4. Variables with a positive sign are
expected to have a positive effect on the marginal productivity of labor (w) increasing the probability of
belonging to a higher category. Results referred to the ﬁrst set of variables, those determining the mpla,
conﬁrm the predictions of the comparative static exercise; larger land size, for example, has a positive
impact on w, therefore lowers the probability of working off farm and increases the probability of hiring
in labor.
14In the 1997 the South Africa pension system provides a maximum beneﬁt of 370 rand a month (around half of household
average income) to all women over the age of 60 and men over the age of 65 which can be reduced on the basis of individual
incomes including income from assets (Case and Deaton, 1998).
10Table 3: Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption
Variable chi2 p>chi2
Land (ha) 3.20 0.074
Buildings (dummy) 0.13 0.718
Index of land quality (by district) 0.15 0.698
Unskilled labor - male 1.76 0.185
Unskilled labor - female 2.15 0.143
Skilled labor 0.05 0.819
Age of household head 3.19 0.074
Length of residency 2.42 0.120
Gender of household head 10.16 0.001
Labor market dev. index (by district) 7.86 0.005
Access to information (dummy) 10.93 0.001
Contact with extension ofﬁcer (dummy) 8.17 0.004
Members receiving pensions 8.23 0.004
Migrants 8.84 0.003
Table 4: Results of the generalized ordered logit





Unskilled labor - female -0.173
(0.030)




Age of household head 0.003
(0.003)
Length of residency 0.006
(0.001)
Labor market dev. index -0.615 -0.384
(0.174) (0.205)
Gender of household head -0.783 -0.290
(0.111) (0.134)
Access to information 0.007 0.715
(0.124) (0.188)
Contact with extension ofﬁcer 0.086 0.724
(0.176) (0.177)




Province and area dummies omitted. Numbers reported in parentheses are the standard errors;
*, ** and *** indicates a signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Results can be also related to those from two binary logit models in which the ﬁrst category (small
peasants) is related to the other two and, in the second one, the ﬁrst two classes are compared to the
highest (hiring in households). In this way, the coefﬁcients referred to the small peasants category only,
can be interpreted as affecting the probability of being in a higher class through their effect on the
11effective off farm market wage (e wo). Exogenous transfers lower the marginal value of liquidity () and
decrease e wo (equation 2); as expected, households receiving pensions and remittances are less likely to
work off farm and can rely on their family activity. On the other hand, a higher degree of development
of the local labor market also affects the threshold (e wo) as it implies lower transaction costs; households
headed by a male member also face lower transaction costs in the labor market. These two latter factors
have a positive impact on the effective market wage off farm and increases the probability of being small
peasants. Looking at the third column of results, access to information through media and contacts with
extension ofﬁcers has a positive impact on the probability of hiring in labor. This may be due to the
reduction in searching and supervision costs related to improved farmer knowledge. The gender of the
head affect the membership of this category; male headed household are less likely to be in the highest
category this can be interpret also as a liquidity related factor since in South Africa rural area male heads
tend to migrate to the urban centers (Makhura, 2001), therefore their presence in the household may
signal a liquidity shortage, this interpretation can also explain the loss of signiﬁcance of the remittances
variable coefﬁcient.
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored how, in an imperfect markets context, asset endowments and liquidity status can
affect the labor allocation strategy chosen by the household. Market imperfections are translated into
wage differential where transactions costs and the marginal value of liquidity determine the difference
between the hiring in and out wage; a brant test on coefﬁcient constancy has help to empirically identify
the determinants of such wage gap. Access to land has a positive impact on the ability of the household
to rely on own activity and become employer of labor. The lack of liquidity induces household members
to work off farm and restricts the ability of acquiring farm inputs including hired labor. This conﬁrms
what has been previously found in the literature (Van Zyl et al. (1995) and Fenwick and Lyne (1999)) and
suggests the need for policy reforms in the rural credit and land sectors. On the other hand, promoting the
development of the labor market and improving local infrastructures can help farmers to gain alternative
income sources and cope with liquidity shortage.
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13Appendix
A Comparative statics
The shadow wage, w in the case of labor-autarkic households will be implicitly estimated and used as a
latent decision variable in the empirical section of this study. To analyze how household characteristics
and exogenous factors affects household membership in the three categories, we need ﬁrst to analyze
the shadow price response to changes in its determinants. To simplify this analysis we ﬁrst consider the
shadow price of inputs, e p as exogenously given and later we examine the factors affecting the endogenous
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where: a =  u11 + u1ypqL   uyypqLpqL   uypqLL, b = u12(1   k) + u1yw2
ok   uyypqLw2
o and
c = u1ypqA   uypqLA   uyypqA. Recalling Cramer’s rule, the marginal effect of the k-th exogenous







where D is the determinant of the ﬁrst matrix reported above and Dwk is the determinant of the matrix
obtained substituting the k-th column in the last matrix into the third column of the ﬁrst. Applying this
rule to the above system of equations we obtain:
D = uy(pqLLpqxx   pqLxpqLx)   u1ypqLpqxx + u11pqxx   u1ypqLpqxx + uyypqLpqLpqxx
In order to guarantee the existence of a maximum in the case of multiple inputs production function, the
following condition need to be satisﬁed : qLLpqxx   pqLxpqLx > 015, therefore the overall sign of the
determinant is positive.
15This condition is be used also to determined the sign of derivatives.
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[u1ypqL(pqLxpqLx   pqLApqxx + pqLxpqxA) + u11(pqLApqxx   pqLxpqxAx)
+uyypqLpqL(pqLApqxx   pqLxpqLA)   2uypqLpqxpqLL)   u1ypqLApqxx] > 0
Given the negative relationship between non-labor input price and the shadow wage, factors relaxing
the household liquidity constraint and, consequently, negatively affecting the shadow price of inputs are
expected to have a positive impact on the endogenous shadow price.
15